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Organising Methods and Member Recruitment in Irish Trade 
Unions 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose 
This paper explores the recruiting and organising methods used by Irish full-time 
union officials to recruit new members in the private sector of the economy.  
 
Design/methodology/approach 
The analysis is based on a survey of full-time union officials in eight Irish trade 
unions.  
 
Findings 
Results indicate that the use of organising techniques by officials had no significant 
impact on changes in membership numbers but did have a significant and positive 
impact on reported changes in new members. However, the variance explained was 
extremely modest.  
 
Research limitations and implications 
A potential limitation is that we assess the organising model solely from the 
perspective of full-time union officials. An area for future research would be to 
capture the attitudes and experiences of local activists involved in organising. 
 
 
Practical implications 
The demands of the organising approach require great commitment in terms of time 
and financial resources for unions. Yet the returns from this investment may be slight 
as we found only a relatively weak relationship between the number of organising 
methods used and changes in membership numbers and the recruitment of new 
members. 
 
Originality/value of paper 
To date there has been little systematic study of either the recruitment methods used 
by Irish trade unions or the relative success of different approaches. Based on a 
survey of Irish full-time union officials this paper attempts to address this lacuna.  
 
 
Key words: Union recruitment, organising methods, private sector 
 
Paper type Research paper 
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Organising Methods and Member Recruitment in Irish Trade 
Unions 
 
 
Introduction 
Union recruitment and organising has been high on trade union agendas across 
developed countries as unions seek to reverse the decline in unionisation. Like trade 
unions in Britain, Australia and the US, Irish unions have been forced to examine 
their operations and future in the context of declining union density. Between 1980 
and 2007, union density in the Irish labour force dropped from approximately 61 
percent to 31 percent (Gunnigle et al., 2002; CSO, 2008). While unionisation has 
remained generally stable and high in the public sector, it has dropped significantly in 
the private sector. Private sector unionisation is estimated to have fallen to as low as 
20 percent (Sheehan, 2008). This significant decline in unionisation has occurred 
despite a benign political context compared to that in Britain, Australia and the US. 
Irish trade unions influenced economic and social policy decision making through a 
series of centralised agreements with employers and Government between 1987 and 
2008. It has been suggested that the centralisation of bargaining neutralises employer 
opposition and has a positive impact on union density and growth (Visser, 2002; see 
also Corneo, 1995). However, these outcomes have not been evident in the Irish case 
(D’Art and Turner, 2005). For Irish trade unions the outcomes traditionally associated 
with strong corporatist regimes such as increased union availability and improved 
workplace access, have not materialized (D’Art and Turner, 2005 and forthcoming). 
Despite two decades of social partnership the unions failed to gain any improvement 
in the legal environment for union recognition in the face of increasing opposition 
from employers. 
The steep decline in private sector unionisation levels has prompted many trade 
unions to focus on intensive recruitment campaigns targeted at certain groups (cf. 
Snape, 1994). For example SIPTU, the largest Irish union, has attempted to recruit 
from specific groups such as young people, women, atypical workers, workers in 
multinationals, migrant workers and industries which are considered ‘ripe’ for union 
drives (Dobbins, 2003, 2004; Higgins, 1999). To date there has been little systematic 
study of either the recruitment methods used by Irish trade unions or the relative 
success of different approaches. Based on a survey of Irish full-time union officials 
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and the methods used to recruit new members this paper attempts to address this 
lacuna.  
 
Union Recruitment and Organising 
Union recruitment activity has been identified as a key factor in the rise and fall of 
union membership and density (Heery et al., 2000b; Metcalf, 1991; Kelly, 1990). 
Union decline has prompted a shift in the views of unions on issues of recruitment. 
Beaumont and Harris (1990) note that unions traditionally believed that union 
membership growth and decline was dependant on economic and political factors (see 
also Undy et al., 1981). This view was reflected in the work of union officials. 
Research indicated that most of union officials’ time was taken up with negotiation, 
administration and servicing of members rather than recruitment   (Clegg et al, 1961; 
Beaumont and Harris, 1990; Brown and Lawson, 1973; Robertson and Sams, 1976). 
More recently, explanations that focus on the inadequacies of union recruitment 
policies have been advanced to account for the decline in union membership such as 
limited investment in organizing (Voos, 1984), an unwillingness to attempt organising 
beyond traditional groups of workers (Beaumont and Harris, 1990; McLoughlin and 
Gourlay, 1994: 41) and the use of ineffective or poorly developed union recruitment 
techniques (Kelly and Heery, 1994; Bronfenbrenner, 1997; Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich, 1998; Waddington and Kerr, 1999; Waddington and Whitston, 1997). The 
renewed emphasis on union renewal through recruitment is generally focused on 
attempts to make it more strategic and high profile rather than non-specialist, reactive, 
decentralised and low profile (Beaumont and Harris, 1990). The emergence of an 
increasingly strategic approach to the recruitment of new members has been 
subsumed into a more encompassing generic organising model of union recruitment 
that seeks to increase membership through workplace activism. 
 
The Organising Model: Theory and Practice 
The organising model has been defined as an approach that aims to organise workers 
so that they are ‘empowered’ to define and pursue their own interests through the 
medium of collective organisation (Heery et al, 2000a:38). The term organising model 
is essentially a descriptive or heuristic device rather than a model or theory with 
explanatory or predictive qualities. Indeed, literature on organising has failed to 
develop a definition of it and it is difficult to ‘pin down’ a definitive set of measures 
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of the organising model. Discussions on the organising model have centred on the 
practices it encompasses and the outcomes it is supposed to produce. It is an 
encompassing label used to describe a an extensive range of union practices ranging 
from direct recruitment methods to political and community activism (see Appendix 1 
for a list of organising practices as identified in literature). The outcomes of using 
these practices are argued to be an increase in new members and increased activism 
amongst members so that they handle disputes thereby reducing reliance on paid 
union staff (Dundon et al., 1999; Oxenbridge, 1997; Fiorito, 2004). In theory, the 
increased involvement of lay representatives and shop stewards facilitates a more 
efficient use of union resources and increases democracy within the union (de 
Turberville, 2004).  
 
The organising model is contrasted, usually favourably, to the more passive servicing 
model of recruitment. A service model of trade unionism is one where the function of 
the union is to deliver collective and individual services to members provided by the 
formal organisation and its hierarchy of officers (Heery et al., 2000a:38). Thus, under 
the servicing model, the responsibility for union resources, strategies and interests, 
handling grievances and recruitment rests primarily with union officials (Fletcher and 
Hurd, 1998; Carter and Cooper, 2002). Critics of service unionism argue that it is 
disempowering for union members because union tactics such as legal cases can be 
remote from members’ workplaces (cf. Crosby, 2002). Alternatively, it could be 
argued that the threat and outcomes of individual legal cases can be used by unions to 
encourage collective action (McCammon, 2001; Colling, 2006). Thus servicing and 
organising are not necessarily mutually exclusive (see Fiorito, 2004).  
 
Despite the advocacy of organizing methods of building activism from the grass-roots 
up to ensure long-term membership stability, the uptake and successfulness of the 
model to date has not been extensive (Oxenbridge, 1997:26). There have been a small 
number of publicised campaigns in the US based on the organising model (cf. Hurd, 
1993; Waldinger et al., 1998). According to Bronfenbrenner and Hickey (2004:17), 
these high profile organising victories have been concentrated in a few unions and 
industries, “while the majority of unions in the US continue to experience organizing 
losses and declining membership”. In a survey of union officials in Britain, Fiorito 
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(2004) found that roughly half of the sample indicated that their unions were adopting 
the organising model. From their research, Heery et al (2000b) concluded that British 
unions were selective in the use of the organising model practices and that there was 
no major organizing union dedicated mainly to the extension of union organization.  
Various reasons have been advanced for the relatively low uptake and poor adoption 
of the organising approach. Firstly, the organising approach requires significant 
investment yet not all unions ascribing to organising have provided the necessary 
resources (Voos, 1984; Snape, 1995; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, 2004; Carter and 
Cooper, 2002). Indeed, the increased workload associated with implementing an 
organising approach without the concomitant resources has been a source of 
frustration for union officers (Heery et al., 2003b; Fiorito, 2004; Carter and Cooper, 
2002). Secondly, a number of studies have pointed to the influential role of union 
leaders in the adoption and success of union renewal strategies (Fiorito, 2004; 
Oxenbridge, 1997; Voss and Sherman, 2000; Kelly, 1998; Carter and Cooper, 2002; 
Griffin and Moors, 2004). While insufficient resources may signal a lack of 
commitment to organising, conversely an overenthusiastic leadership is not a 
guarantee of success. Union leaders, who impose a top-down approach to organising 
without the necessary buy-in from union officials, militates against the 
democratization that is supposed to be an output of organising and can result in the 
failure of the organising approach (Carter and Cooper, 2002; de Turberville, 2004).  
 
Thirdly, scepticism or even opposition to the organising approach can be related to 
union officials’ belief in the servicing model. While the intention of union leadership 
may be to move away from servicing to organising, advising and representing 
individual members still remains a significant part of a union official’s job (Colling, 
2006; Heery, 2006; Higgins, 2008; Snape, 1994). For example, Carter and Cooper 
(2002) noted that officials surveyed in the Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union 
(MSF) in Britain were unhappy with the characterization of servicing as valueless and 
organising as ‘good’ and also with the belief of key national officials that it was 
possible to change practice overnight. The overwhelming conclusion of officers from 
the MSF study was that organising was simply an addition to existing practice, rather 
than an attempt to transform it. Thus, union officials’ own commitment to organising 
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can be influenced by their belief in organising, the process in which union leadership 
introduce the approach and the resource provision attached to it.  
 
Methodology 
These criticisms aside there is some limited evidence that the organising model 
enhances the recruitment of new union members (e.g. Badigannavar and Kelly, 2005; 
Erickson et al, 2002). This paper explores the recruiting and organising methods used 
by full-time union officials in the private sector. A postal survey of officials was 
carried out in eight Irish trade unions. The unions were selected on the basis that their 
membership was either wholly or partly drawn from the private sector. Upon request 
from the authors, all of the unions selected granted full access for the study. 
According to the information supplied by these unions, approximately 226,362 of 
their members are employed in the private sector. This represents up to 90 per cent of 
private sector union members. Consequently, the officials surveyed can be taken as 
broadly representing private sector union members. A total of 195 union officials 
were surveyed and 82 completed questionnaires returned. This represents a response 
rate of 42 per cent. Based on the literature and studies of the organising model we 
suggest a basic model (figure 1) in which outcomes such as increased recruitment 
(Dundon et al, 1997; Oxenbridge, 1997) are a function of different organising 
methods and techniques (Heery et al,  2000a; Carter and Cooper, 2002; Oxenbridge 
2000) that are in turn influenced by a number of factors such as necessary resources 
(Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, 2004; Heery et al, 2003b), support of union leaders 
(Kelly, 1998; Fiorito, 2004) and union officer commitment (Colling, 2006; Heery, 
2006).  
 
Based on this survey we first test whether the greater use of organising methods is 
associated with organising and recruitment success (Fig I). Secondly, we test the 
various factors that influence union officers’ choice of recruitment methods. As noted 
above union officers with a heavy workload and scarce resources are less likely to 
favour the organising model. A central influence on the choice of tactics will be the 
extent to which their union is committed to recruiting and organising new members. It 
is also likely that a union officer’s personal commitment to recruiting will affect the 
choice of organising methods. Other factors in the Irish context influencing organising 
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are likely to be the difficulties of union recognition and employer opposition.  During 
the 1990s there was a sharp rise in the number of union recognition recommendations 
from the Labour Court and the number and intensity of strikes related to union 
recognition. In those cases where the Labour Court recommended recognition of the 
trade union, few of the companies involved acted on the recommendations (Gunnigle 
et al, 2002). Employer opposition to trade unions also appears to have increased 
during the period of social partnership with union officials reporting an increase in the 
use of coercive tactics by employers (McMahon, 2001; D’Art and Turner, 2005 and 
2006).  Employer opposition raises the costs and difficulties of recruiting new 
members. Unless adequate resources are provided, union officers may prefer to avoid 
involvement with recalcitrant employers. Similarly union officers are more likely to 
favour recruiting in traditionally unionised sectors such as manufacturing. Thus, we 
include work load, personal commitment to recruitment, union commitment to 
recruitment, employer opposition and the sector covered by the union officer. It may 
also be the case that the above factors have a direct influence on recruitment 
outcomes. In addition it might be expected that younger union officers, less socialised 
into the service model than older officers, will be more likely to adopt the organising 
model of union recruitment. A potential limitation in testing the organising model is 
that we assess the model through one narrow perspective – that of full-time union 
officials. 
 
Fig. I Factors Influencing Officials’ Uptake of the Organising Model and Success 
of the Organising Model 
Influencing factors 
 
Organising  Outcomes 
 Age 
 Autonomy 
 Training 
 
 
  
 
 Official’s commitment  Use of organising 
model 
 Recruitment of 
new members 
 Work load 
 Occupational coverage 
 Union commitment 
 Employer opposition 
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Description of measures 
As the organising approach is central to the research questions here it is essential to 
grasp something of its content. Based on the list in Appendix 1, we identified two 
dimensions of organising and the measures of these dimensions are outlined in table 1 
with means and standard deviation. The first dimension is oriented toward building 
organisational and members’ capacity to engage in union activity. Organising 
capacity is composed of five items ranging from encouraging members to be active, 
supporting and training lay representatives, building collective organisation and 
setting up an organising committee. The second dimension of organising is designed 
to build the recruitment capacity of the union through member and lay-activism. 
Recruitment capacity is composed of seven items to include encouraging recruitment 
by lay activists, person-to-person recruitment and use of community organisations 
(Table 1). Mean scores for both dimensions are relatively high. Organising capacity 
has a mean of 12.1 from a possible range 5 to 15 and recruitment capacity has a mean 
of 19.2 and a range of 7 to 28. Both dimensions are combined to provide an overall 
measure for organising. Although the alphas for both measures are relatively low 
(organising capacity=0.54 and recruitment capacity=0.43) our construction of these 
measures reflects the main themes in the organising the literature. These measures are 
best viewed as a heuristic device that comes closest in a descriptive sense to 
measuring the organising activities as outlined in the literature. The two dependent 
variables measure the change in union membership and recruitment of new members 
over the past three years amongst the workers that the union official covers. A change 
in union membership is essentially a measure of turnover – people who leave and join 
the union and is a net figure of change over a three year period. In contrast the second 
measure is a narrower measure and refers only to changes in ‘new’ members. The two 
measures are used to get a sense of trends in overall membership levels and to 
differentiate between new members and other members.  
Four of the control measures – union-provided training, autonomy, official’s 
commitment to recruitment and the union commitment to recruitment - are composite 
measures constructed from items in the survey. 
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Table I: Description of measures 
Controls Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Age Scored: 1=Under 20; 2=21-25; 3=26-30; 4=31-40; 5=41-50; 6=51-60; 7=60+  5.1 0.83 
Gender Scored: Female=1; Male=0 0.19 / 
Training 
(Alpha=0.67) 
Composed of 2 items: Has your union provided training in 1. Recruitment 
techniques; 2. Organising techniques/model. Scored 1=yes; 0=no. Composite range 
0 to 2. 
1.1 0.87 
Autonomy 
 
(Alpha=0.7) 
Composed of 3 items: How much autonomy do you believe you have with regard to 
the following activities: 1.Deciding which workers to recruit; 2.Choosing 
recruitment methods; 3.Selecting targets for recognition. Item scored 0=none; 
1=some; 2=moderate; 3= a great deal. Composite range 0 to 9. 
8.1 1.5 
Experience of 
employer opposition 
Starting with the most 4 recent case you were involved in, did the employer oppose 
recognition. Scored 0=No cases opposed; 1=25% cases opposed; 2=33% cases 
opposed; 4=50% cases opposed; 5=66% cases opposed; 7=75% cases opposed; 
8=all cases opposed. Mean based on a 0 (no opposition) to 1 (all opposed) score. 
 
0.71 
 
/ 
Commitment to 
recruitment 
(Alpha=0.62) 
Composed of 3 items: How would you characterise your own commitment to 
pursuing the following objectives: 1.Recruiting new members; 2.Building 
workplace organisation. 3. Seeking new recognition agreements. Items scored 
1=weak; 2=moderate; 3=strong. Composite range 0 to 9. 
8.4 1.02 
Work load How many union members do you currently have  direct responsibility for? Scored: 
1=100-1000; 2=1001-2500; 3=2501-5000; 4=5001+. 
5.6 1.5 
Union commitment 
to recruitment 
(Alpha=0.71) 
Composed of 3 items: How strong do you believe is the commitment of your union 
to  pursuing the following objectives: 1.Recruiting new members; 3. Strengthening 
workplace organisation; 2. Seeking new recognition agreements. Items scored 
1=weak; 2=moderate; 3=strong. Composite range 0 to 9. 
8.0 1.3 
Main occupational 
coverage 
Scored: 1=Managers and administrators; 2=Professional workers; 3=Associate 
professional & technical workers; 4=Clerical and secretarial; 5=Craft and related; 
6=Personal and protective service workers; 7=Sales workers; 8=Plant and machine 
operatives. 
5.9 2.1 
 Measures of the organising model   
Organising capacity 
(Alpha=0.54) 
Composed of 5 items: 1.Encouraging members to become active; 2.Advising and 
supporting lay reps; 3.Training lay representatives; 4.Building collective 
organisation amongst members; 5. Setting up an ‘organising committee’ within 
targeted workplaces (q10). Scored: 1=not part of job;2=some part of 
job;3=very/most important part of job. Composite range 5 to 15. 
12.1 1.7 
Recruitment 
capacity 
(Alpha=0.43) 
Composed of 7 items: 1. Identifying sites for union recruitment (q3); 2.Encouraging 
recruitment by lay activists (q3); 3. Person-to-person recruitment at the workplace; 
4. Link up with community organisations; 5. Corporate campaigning (eg contacting 
shareholders to encourage recognition); 6. Direct recruitment by activists at other 
workplaces.7. Rating of potential members in terms of likelihood of joining the 
union (mapping). Scored 1=not used; 2=used rarely’3=used occasionally; 4=used 
frequently. Composite range 7 to 28. 
19.2 2.8 
Organising model 
(Alpha=0.4) 
Composed of 2 items: organising capacity and recruitment capacity 31.2 3.7 
 Dependent measures   
Membership 
numbers 
Over the past three years has union membership amongst the workers for whom 
you have responsibility changed: scored 1=Decreased by 10% or more2=Decreased 
by less than 10% 3=Stable level of membership; 4=Increased by less than 10%; 
5=Increased by 10% or more. 
2.2 1.2 
New members Over the past three years has recruitment of new members amongst the workers for 
whom you have responsibility changed: scored 1=Decreased by 10% or 
more2=Decreased by less than 10% 3=Stable level of membership; 4=Increased by 
less than 10%; 5=Increased by 10% or more. 
1.9 0.8 
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Results 
The majority of respondents were male (80%) with an average age of 45. This 
indicates a considerable life experience in trade unions and industrial relations. 
Indeed, over the past five years the average number of cases in which officials were 
involved in attempts to secure union recognition from an employer was approximately 
seven. The main occupational groups represented by the officials are operatives (36% 
coverage), sales (16%), craft (14%) and clerical workers (14%) concentrated in the 
manufacturing and retail sectors. Approximately two thirds of the officials had a 
direct responsibility for 1000 to 5000 union members.  
 
With regard to employer opposition, union officials reported a high level of 
opposition in union recognition campaigns they were involved in. Thirty five percent 
of officials reported that the employer opposed recognition in every campaign, 32 
percent of officials indicated opposition in three quarters of all campaigns and only 
eight percent experienced no employer opposition in recognition campaigns. Even 
less variability is evident in three other independent measures: autonomy, individual 
commitment to recruitment and the union’s commitment to recruitment. All three 
exhibit low levels of variance with mean averages of eight or above from a possible 
range of 0 to 9. Thus these measures are likely at best to be weak predictors of an 
organising approach. The majority of union officials reported an increase in both 
union membership generally and specifically new members.  Thirty seven percent of 
officials indicated an increase of more than 10 percent in new members while 38 
percent reported an increase of less than 10 percent. However, only 1 percent of 
officials believed that the recruitment of new members had decreased. This result is 
not surprising. Although union density in Ireland declined dramatically after 1990, 
union membership numbers actually increased by about 17 percent due to an increase 
in the size of the employed labour force (Roche and Ashmore, 2000).  
 
Multivariate analysis 
Based on the model outlined above we first explore the factors that determine the use 
of an organising approach. The dependent measures are organising capacity, 
recruitment capacity and the organising model combining the two measures. As table 
II indicates, the regression equations are not statistically robust and are only 
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significant at the 10 percent level (F score). Indeed, significance at the ten percent 
level was only achieved by reducing the number of control variables in the equations. 
Furthermore, the variance explained in the dependent measures is relatively low at 
between six and eight percent (adjusted r
2
). These qualifications aside occupational 
coverage is significantly (at the 10% level) associated with organising capacity 
(equation 1) though not with recruitment capacity or the full organising model. This 
indicates that the greater use of organising methods is more likely where union 
officials cover members in higher level occupations. The commitment of the official 
to recruitment is strongly and significantly associated with increased use of 
recruitment capacity methods and the combined organising model (equations 2 and 3). 
Thus the higher the commitment level of officials the more likely they are to use 
recruitment capacity methods and the overall organising methods. Essentially this is 
the only robust association that can be drawn for table II. 
 
Table II: Factors influencing use of organising practices 
(Dependent variable: Organising. Ordinary least squares regression, method: enter+ used. Standardised 
coefficients reported).  
 1 2 3 
 Organising 
capacity 
Recruit 
capacity 
Organising 
model 
Controls     
Age -0.07 0.09 0.03 
Own commitment 0.14 0.38*** 0.36*** 
Members covered 0.05 -0.09 -0.04 
Occupational coverage -0.2* 0.12 0.0 
    
Adjusted r
2
 0.06 0.08 0.06 
F score 2.1* 2.4* 2.0* 
N 67 62 61 
Ns =not significant 
* P<0.1  ** P<0.05  ***P<0.01 
 
 
In table III the dependent measures are changes in membership numbers and in new 
members are these are regressed on the controls and the measures of the organising 
model. Equations 1 and 2 include only the four controls: commitment to recruitment, 
membership coverage, occupational coverage and employer opposition. Equation 2 
fails to reach significance and can be discounted. However equation 1 is statistically 
robust and explains 21 percent of the variance in the change in membership numbers. 
Commitment, employer opposition and, to a lesser extent, occupational coverage are 
significantly associated with change in membership numbers. There is a consistent 
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relationship between a respondent’s commitment to recruitment and positive changes 
in membership numbers (equations 1, 3 and 5). The extent of employer opposition 
experienced by officials is also consistently significant across these three equations. 
Paradoxically it appears that officials who report higher levels of employer opposition 
are more likely to report an increase in membership numbers. It may be the case that 
officials who recruit aggressively are more likely to experience employer opposition 
compared to officials with a more passive approach. Hence, higher levels of employer 
opposition experienced by officials may indicate greater organising and recruitment 
activity. The measures of the organising model are entered in equations 3 and 5. All 
three measures fail to reach significance. Indeed, these measures actually reduce the 
level of variance in the change in membership numbers explained compared to 
equation 1. Consequently, it can be concluded that the use of organising techniques or 
methods (as measured here) by the officials surveyed has no significant impact on 
changes in membership numbers. 
  
By contrast, the inclusion of the organising measures in equations 4 and 6 to explain 
change in new members considerably improves the statistical significance of the 
regressions and the variance explained in the dependent variable. Somewhat 
surprisingly the greater the size of the membership covered by an official, the more 
likely they are to report an increase in new members. A possible explanation for this 
relationship maybe that greater member coverage is correlated with firm size as large 
firms are easier to service and recruitment of new members is also easier. In equation 
4 the extent of recruitment capacity methods is significant (albeit at the 10% level) 
though not organising capacity. However, the combination of both measures is 
strongly significant in equation 6. A greater use of the organising model by officials 
appears to have a significant positive impact on reported changes in new members. 
While this finding tends to confirm that the increased use of the organising model is 
associated with greater recruitment success some qualification is required. The level 
of variance accounted for in the change in new members is only 17 percent in 
equation 6. Indeed, if the controls are omitted then the organising model explains only 
7 percent of the variance in the dependent measure. Thus the association between the 
use of organising methods and recruitment of new members can hardly be considered 
decisive.  
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Table III: Factors influencing changes in membership numbers 
(Dependent variable: Change in union membership. Ordinary least squares regression, method: enter+ 
used. Standardised coefficients reported).  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Change in 
Membership 
numbers 
Change in 
new 
Members 
Change in 
Membership 
numbers 
Change in 
new 
Members 
Change in 
Membership 
numbers 
Change 
in new 
Members 
Controls        
Own commitment 0.33*** 0.06 0.25* -0.09 0.27** -0.09 
Members covered 0.06 -0.01 0.13 0.3** 0.11 0.3** 
Occupation cover -0.21* 0.1 -0.22 -0.08 -0.16 -0.09 
Employer opposed 0.26** 0.06 0.26** 0.17 0.28** 0.17 
       
Organise       
Organise capacity   -0.07 0.18   
Recruit capacity   0.23 0.26*   
Organising model     0.15 0.35*** 
       
Adjusted r
2
 0.21 0.0 0.2 0.15 0.19 0.17 
F score 5.1*** 0.8 (ns) 3.2*** 2.5** 3.5*** 3.1** 
N 61 61 53 53 53 53 
Ns =not significant 
* P<0.1  ** P<0.05  ***P<0.01 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Based on a survey of union officials this paper tested the relationship between various 
factors such as commitment to recruitment, employer opposition, 
membership/occupational coverage and union officers’ choice of recruitment 
methods. Secondly, we test whether the use of an organising approach is associated 
with organising success as measured by changes in levels of membership and newly 
acquired members. In the former case we found only a weak relationship between the 
commitment level of officials and the use of organising methods. In the latter case the 
use of organising techniques by the officials surveyed had no significant impact on 
changes in membership numbers. However the greater use of the organising model by 
officials had a significant and positive impact on reported changes in new members. 
Yet the variance explained by the use of the organising approach was extremely 
modest. Indeed, the results here give relatively scant support to the advocates of the 
organising approach to union recruitment. It may of course be the case that the 
specified model and measurements used here fail to provide an adequate test of the 
effectiveness of the organising model. This tends to be a perennial problem with 
survey based research and its inability to capture the rich texture of everyday social 
processes. Clearly our data and methodology reflect the general weaknesses of this 
approach. In addition, as our findings are based on the experiences of full-time union 
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officials, an area for future research would be to capture the attitudes and experiences 
of local activists of putting the organising model into practice. 
 
Using the interpretations of union officials, the theoretical weakness of the organising 
model is apparent. In practise union organising and servicing activities are likely to 
overlap, contributing to the difficulty in defining the boundaries of the organising 
model. In addition, some of the practices included in table 1 could be categorised as 
traditional recruitment such as planned organising campaigns and paid lead 
organisers. Thus during a ‘recruitment’ campaign it may be difficult to distinguish 
where traditional recruitment ends and organising begins because the organising 
model fails to indicate how the organising process works and ‘…fails to show any 
clear path from internal mobilization to external organizing’ (Fletcher and Hurd, 
1998:44).  
 
As our review of the literature suggests the organising model as a construct lacks 
definitional and conceptual rigour. In the absence of such rigour it is difficult to 
develop appropriate empirical measures of the dimensions that constitute the 
organising model (Gorz, 2005). There are also questions regarding the ambiguousness 
of the objectives of the organising model (de Turberville, 2004). Many of its 
advocates emphasise that the organising model’s primary objective is not to recruit 
members but to foster activism and organising (cf. Carter, 2000; Heery et al., 2000a). 
Recruiting members then becomes an indirect outcome of organising. In unionised 
workplaces it may be that organising will lead to the recruitment of new members. 
However in firms where no union is established recruitment of union members would 
appear to be a necessary first step to create the conditions for an organising drive. In 
practice the organising model amounts to a collection of tactics and techniques 
defined more by their extent and intensity
i
 than any qualitative difference from the 
long activist tradition in Irish and British trade unionism (Newsinger, 2003; Heery 
and Kelly, 1990). Yet activism such as participating in union affairs, canvassing for 
new members and commitment to the principles of trade unionism has always been 
confined to a critical minority of union members, in particular lay and full-time union 
officers and shop stewards (Flood et al, 1996; D'Art and Turner, 2002; Heery and 
Kelly, 1990). Full-time union officials are generally appointed after many years of 
shop floor activism and tend to be highly committed trade unionists.  
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The demands of the organising approach require great commitment in terms of time, 
enormous energy and the confrontation of often hostile employers. Unless substantial 
extra resources are available, it is unlikely that union officials would be able to sustain 
the ‘permanent’ activism required by the organising model. Organising campaigns are 
also costly and there is a limit to the scarce resources of trade unions. Clearly there 
are also political avenues to increasing the membership and density of trade unions as 
well as organising campaigns by individual trade unions. Historical trends in union 
membership numbers and density across the developed industrial societies reflect in 
the main political and institutional developments rather than the extent or intensity of 
workplace activism and organising (see also Western, 1997). For example the high 
union density levels in countries such as Sweden and Denmark derive from political 
conditions that created a relatively benign institutional environment supportive of 
union membership and collective bargaining. Nevertheless employer hostility and 
weak institutional support from the state would appear to make renewed attention on 
organising and recruiting workers an imperative for Irish trade unions.  
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Appendix I 
Literature Review: Practices Associated with the Organising Model 
Practice Heery et al  
2000a 
Heery et al 
2003b 
Carter & 
Cooper 
2002 
Oxenbridge 
2000 & 
1997 
Findlay & 
McKinlay 
2003 
Cooper 
2001 
Bronfenh
ener & 
Hickey 
2004 
Planned organising campaigns X X   X X  
Paid lead organisers X X  X X X  
Activists through organising 
committee 
X X X X X  X 
Mapping techniques X    X   
Identifying issues/grievances X       
Actions X  X X    
One to one recruitment X  X X X   
Like recruits like X       
Publicising concessions from 
employer 
X       
Identification of levers, allies, 
pressure points 
X       
Involvement of political, 
community, consumer groups 
X X      
Encourage workplace reps to 
recruit 
X X      
Demonstrations, petitions X       
Identify membership targets X       
Alter profile of union officers  X      
Management techniques   X   X  
Splitting org & ser functions   X   X  
Campaigns focused on justice, 
fairness 
  X X    
Leadership commitment   X     
Union recognition        
Home visits X   X   X 
Union education programmes    X   X  
Informal small group meetings    X    
Adequate staff/finance       X 
Strategic targeting       X 
Person to person       X 
Benchmarks       X 
Escalating pressure tactics       X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
i
 Bronfenbrenner for example claims that organizing win rates go up “no matter how hostile employer 
opposition” when union tactics are higher in number, more comprehensive and multi-pronged (Dobbins 
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and Sheehan, 2008). This surely amounts to the obvious: the greater the union power wielded the more 
likely a union victory!  
 
